National Security Act 2023: A Journalist's Guide to the New Espionage Offences and the Foreign Power Condition

What the National Security Act 2023 does

The National Security Act 2023 (c. 32) received Royal Assent on 11 July 2023. Its long title describes it as an Act to make provision about “threats to national security from espionage, sabotage and persons acting for foreign powers”, and it represents the most significant reform of UK espionage law since the early twentieth century. The core offences in Part 1 — together with the state-threats prevention and investigation measures in Part 2 — came into force on 20 December 2023.

The Act replaced the espionage regime contained in the Official Secrets Acts 1911, 1920 and 1939 with modern offences built around a new concept: the “foreign power condition”. Crucially for journalists, the Official Secrets Act 1989 — which governs unauthorised disclosures of security, intelligence, defence and international-relations information — was not repealed. The 1989 Act remains in force alongside the new regime, so the legal risks around leaked material now run across two statutes rather than one.

The Act also created the Foreign Influence Registration Scheme (FIRS) in Part 4, which requires registration of certain arrangements with foreign powers and specified foreign entities. FIRS came into force on 1 July 2025 and is covered in detail below, because the Home Office has published sector-specific guidance for the media.

Why it matters for journalists

The Act was not written about journalism, but its offences intersect with core journalistic activity: obtaining restricted information, receiving documents from sources inside government, publishing material a foreign state might find useful, and working for or with internationally funded news organisations. The offences carry exceptional penalties — up to life imprisonment for the section 1 offence of obtaining or disclosing protected information — and there is no general public-interest defence anywhere in the Act.

During the Bill's passage through Parliament in 2022 and 2023, press-freedom and civil-society organisations — including the National Union of Journalists, Index on Censorship, openDemocracy, Reporters Without Borders, the News Media Association, the Society of Editors and English PEN — warned that the offences were drawn broadly enough to reach public-interest journalism, and campaigned for a statutory public-interest defence. The Joint Committee on Human Rights also concluded that provisions in the Bill risked a chilling effect on legitimate journalism and supported a public-interest defence.

The Government rejected those amendments, arguing that the offences are aimed at state-sponsored espionage and interference rather than reporting, and that legitimate journalism would not satisfy the offence elements. Both positions are set out fairly in this guide — but the practical consequence is the same either way: the boundaries will be tested through prosecution decisions and case law, and journalists handling national-security material need to understand the offence elements themselves rather than rely on assurances.

The key offences

Obtaining or disclosing protected information (section 1). A person commits an offence if they obtain, copy, record or retain protected information — or disclose or provide access to it — where their conduct is for a purpose they know, or ought reasonably to know, is prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom, and the foreign power condition is met. The maximum sentence is life imprisonment. Note the breadth of the conduct element: retaining and copyingare caught, not just publishing. Campaigners highlighted that “protected information” extends beyond classified documents to information whose access is restricted in other ways.

Assisting a foreign intelligence service (section 3).It is an offence to engage in conduct intended to materially assist a foreign intelligence service, or conduct of a kind likely to do so where the person knows or ought reasonably to know that. The maximum sentence is 14 years. Press-freedom groups raised the position of journalists whose reporting might incidentally be useful to a foreign intelligence service; the Government's response was that the offence elements, including the knowledge requirement, exclude legitimate journalism.

Foreign interference (sections 13 to 16).Section 13 criminalises prohibited conduct — which can include misrepresentation — carried out for or on behalf of a foreign power with the intention of producing an “interference effect”, such as interfering with the exercise of rights or with political processes in the UK. The maximum sentence is 14 years.

The foreign power condition (section 31).This is the gateway concept for the core offences. It is met where conduct is carried out for or on behalf of a foreign power, and the person knows — or ought reasonably to know — that this is the case. Section 31(2) expands the net: conduct counts as carried out for or on behalf of a foreign power where it is instigated by a foreign power, under a foreign power's direction or control, carried out with financial or other assistance provided by a foreign power for that purpose, or carried out in collaboration with, or with the agreement of, a foreign power. It was this breadth — particularly the funding and collaboration limbs — that drove press-freedom concerns about journalists employed by foreign state-linked broadcasters or outlets receiving foreign public funding.

The Foreign Influence Registration Scheme (FIRS)

Part 4 of the Act created FIRS, which came into force on 1 July 2025. It has two tiers. The political influence tier requires registration of arrangements with any foreign power to carry out political-influence activities in the UK — GOV.UK guidance states such arrangements must be registered within 28 days. The enhanced tier requires registration of arrangements with foreign powers or foreign power-controlled entities specified by the Government (at the time of writing, GOV.UK lists specifications relating to Russia and Iran) to carry out a broader range of activities, with a 10-day registration window. Carrying out registerable activities under an unregistered arrangement is a criminal offence.

For the media, the key document is the Home Office's sector-specific FIRS guidance for the media, which confirms an exemption for recognised news publishers, their employees, and freelance journalists working for them. The concept of a recognised news publisher here connects to the framework familiar from the Online Safety Act 2023 — see our OSA guide for how RNP status works.

The exemption is not a blanket pass. Arrangements that fall outside recognised news publishing — for example, a contractual arrangement with a foreign state body to produce content aimed at influencing UK policy, or work for an entity specified under the enhanced tier — can still trigger registration duties. Outlets and freelancers with foreign-state clients, funders or partners should map those relationships against the GOV.UK guidance.

Press-freedom concerns — and the Government's response

In November 2022, Index on Censorship, the NUJ, openDemocracy and Reporters Without Borders published a joint statement calling for “a strong and accessible statutory public interest defence” and warning that the Bill's imprecise drafting risked journalists being treated as spies for doing their jobs. Their analysis emphasised that ministerial assurances that journalists are not the target were not written into the legislation, and that prosecution decisions would ultimately rest with the Attorney General of the day.

The News Media Association urged peers to adopt amendments inserting a public-interest defence and to preserve the protections for journalistic material in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, warning of a chilling effect on investigative journalism and sources. The Society of Editors campaigned on the same two fronts, additionally criticising search powers in the Bill that it said would let senior police officers, rather than courts, authorise access to journalistic material in some circumstances. English PEN, responding to Government amendments on journalistic freedoms in February 2023, welcomed the movement but said the amendments “do not go far enough” without a public-interest defence. The Joint Committee on Human Rights likewise concluded the Bill could chill legitimate journalistic activity.

The Government's position, set out in its journalistic-freedoms factsheet, is that “the offences in the National Security Bill target harmful activity by states, not leaks, whistleblowing activity or public interest journalism”. It argued that a public-interest defence would wrongly imply that espionage could be in the public interest and could be exploited by hostile state actors, and that the offence elements — the requirement of a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the UK, the foreign power condition, and the “knows or ought reasonably to know” formulation — keep legitimate journalism out of scope.

Both accounts are accurate descriptions of what each side said. What is objectively true is narrower: the Act as passed contains no general public-interest defence, the offence elements are the operative safeguards, and how they apply to journalism will be settled in practice by prosecutors and courts rather than by the parliamentary record.

How it sits with the Official Secrets Act 1989 and DSMA-Notices

The Official Secrets Act 1989 still applies. The 1989 Act criminalises unauthorised disclosures of security, intelligence, defence and international-relations information by Crown servants and government contractors — and, under section 5, can reach onward disclosure by those who receive such information, which is where journalists come in. It contains no public-interest defence: the House of Lords confirmed this in R v Shayler [2002] UKHL 11. The Law Commission recommended reform of the 1989 Act, including a statutory public-interest defence, in its 2020 Protection of Official Data report; that reform was not included in the National Security Act 2023.

In practice this means a leak story can raise questions under both regimes at once: the 1989 Act for the unauthorised disclosure itself and any onward publication, and the 2023 Act if any foreign-power link could be alleged anywhere in the chain — the source, a funder, a partner outlet, or the platform of publication.

The DSMA-Notice system is separate and voluntary. The Defence and Security Media Advisory Committee operates standing notices describing categories of information whose publication could damage national security, and its Secretary is available to advise editors before publication. The system is advisory only — it has no statutory force, compliance is not a legal defence, and non-compliance is not an offence — but a documented consultation can inform your risk assessment and shows editorial seriousness. See our dedicated guide to DSMA-Notices in practice.

Handling leaked national-security material

The section 1 offence covers obtaining, copying, recording and retaining protected information, not only disclosing it. That changes newsroom practice: every additional copy, every colleague given access, and every month of retention is conduct the statute describes. Minimise copies, restrict access to the story team, and make deliberate, documented decisions about what is retained and why. Verification work should establish provenance — including whether any foreign power instigated, funded or directed the leak — because that analysis goes directly to the foreign power condition.

Source protection under the new regime interacts with the framework you already know: section 10 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981, the special protections for journalistic material under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, and the safeguards (and gaps) in the Investigatory Powers Act 2016. National-security investigations are precisely where the pressure on those protections is greatest — see our guides to source protection, production orders and the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, and harden your communications using our digital-security guides before you first contact a sensitive source.

Take specialist legal advice before obtaining or moving material where you can, and always before publication. This is not defamation-style risk that can be managed with careful wording after the fact: the offences attach to handling, the penalties are measured in decades, and early advice shapes what you can safely do next. Our guide to finding a media lawyer covers how to reach specialists quickly, including out of hours.

Practical steps before you report

1. Map the statutes engaged.Ask three questions of any national-security story: could the material be “protected information” under section 1 of the 2023 Act; could the disclosure engage the Official Secrets Act 1989; and is there any foreign-power link — funding, employment, collaboration — anywhere in the chain?
2. Audit your own foreign-power exposure. If you or your outlet receive foreign state funding, work for a foreign state-linked broadcaster, or partner with foreign public bodies, document the relationship and get advice on how it bears on the section 31 condition and on FIRS.
3. Minimise handling. Fewest copies, fewest people, shortest necessary retention, and a written record of the editorial justification for each decision.
4. Consider the DSMA route. For defence and security material, weigh a pre-publication consultation with the DSMA-Notice Secretary — advisory, voluntary, and sometimes valuable evidence of responsible conduct.
5. Instruct a specialist early. Involve a media lawyer with national-security experience before acquisition where possible, and certainly before publication. Record the public-interest justification for the story as you go: it is not a statutory defence, but it matters to prosecutorial discretion and to any Article 10 argument.
6. Protect the source first. Assume investigative interest in your communications. Use the secure-communication practices in our digital-security section from first contact, not after the story is commissioned.

Key organisations

• ›National Union of Journalists (NUJ) — Union support and legal assistance for members; campaigned for a public-interest defence in the Act.
• ›Index on Censorship — Convened the joint campaign on the National Security Bill and published detailed analysis of its impact on journalism.
• ›Reporters Without Borders (RSF) — International press-freedom organisation; part of the joint campaign on the Bill.
• ›News Media Association — Industry body for national and local news media; pressed for amendments in the Lords.
• ›Society of Editors — Ran a dedicated campaign on the Bill's implications for journalistic material and sources.
• ›English PEN — Free-expression organisation; assessed the Government's journalistic-freedom amendments as insufficient.

Four things journalists must know about the NSA 2023

Key legislation

Related guides

Primary sources

• ›National Security Act 2023 (full text)
• ›Official Secrets Act 1989
• ›National Security Bill factsheets (Home Office)
• ›Journalistic freedoms factsheet (Home Office)
• ›Foreign Influence Registration Scheme — GOV.UK collection
• ›FIRS: guidance for the media (Home Office)
• ›Coalition statement on the National Security Bill (Index on Censorship, NUJ, openDemocracy, RSF)
• ›NMA urges Lords to adopt public interest defence amendments
• ›English PEN on the Government's proposed amendments
• ›Society of Editors — National Security Bill campaign
• ›Defence and Security Media Advisory (DSMA) Committee
• ›House of Commons Library briefing: National Security Bill 2022-23 (CBP-9559)

Frequently asked questions