DSMA-Notices in Practice: The Voluntary Advisory System Explained

What the DSMA-Notice system actually is

The Defence and Security Media Advisory Notice system is a voluntary, self-regulatory arrangement between the UK government and the news media. Its purpose is narrow: to prevent the inadvertent public disclosure of information that would genuinely damage national security, without imposing censorship. Crucially, a DSMA-Notice is not a court order, not a statute, and not a gag. It is a request for consultation — a mechanism by which editors can check, confidentially and in advance, whether a particular disclosure carries a real security risk.

The whole system rests on cooperation rather than compulsion. Editors are free to publish against advice; the Committee cannot stop them, fine them, or refer them for prosecution. That distinction — advisory system on one side, criminal statutes on the other — is the single most important thing for a working journalist to understand.

From D-Notice to DA-Notice to DSMA-Notice

The system began in 1912 as the “D-Notice” (Defence Notice) arrangement, created before the First World War to manage the tension between a free press and the security concerns of the state. It was renamed the “DA-Notice” (Defence Advisory Notice) system in 1993 to emphasise that the notices are advisory rather than mandatory, and renamed again in 2015 to the current “DSMA-Notice” (Defence and Security Media Advisory Notice) to reflect the broadening of its remit beyond purely military matters into wider security and intelligence questions.

The successive renamings all point in the same direction: away from any suggestion of a legal prohibition and towards a clearer statement that the notices offer guidance, not orders. Older references to “D-Notices” in archive material describe the same underlying, non-binding system.

Who runs it: the Committee and the Secretary

The system is overseen by the DSMA Committee, a joint body drawing together senior officials from government departments with national-security responsibilities and senior representatives nominated by the media and broadcasting industries. This shared composition is deliberate: the media side gives the arrangement its legitimacy and keeps it distinct from state censorship.

Day-to-day work is done by the DSMA-Notice Secretary, conventionally a senior retired military officer, who acts as the confidential point of contact between government and newsrooms. The Secretary maintains the standing notices, advises editors who make contact, and mediates between officials and journalists when a sensitive story is in prospect. The Secretary has no power to direct any outlet — the role is advisory and intermediary, not regulatory.

The five standing DSMA-Notices

Rather than reacting to individual stories, the system publishes five standing notices, each describing a broad category of information whose disclosure could damage national security and inviting editors to consult before publishing within it:

• ›Military operations, plans and capabilities — including current and future operations, deployments, and details that could reveal operational readiness or vulnerabilities.
• ›Nuclear and non-nuclear weapons and equipment — sensitive information about weapons systems, munitions and defensive equipment.
• ›Military counter-terrorist forces, special forces, and the intelligence and security agencies — their operations, methods, techniques and communications.
• ›Physical property and assets — the location, layout and security arrangements of sensitive defence and security sites.
• ›Personnel and their families who work in sensitive positions — the identities and personal details of those whose exposure could endanger them or compromise operations.

The notices themselves are openly published and unclassified. They tell an editor where the recognised sensitivities lie so that consultation can be targeted and informed — they do not prohibit anything.

Consulting the Secretary before publication

The practical mechanism is straightforward. When a journalist or editor is preparing a story that appears to touch one of the standing notices, they may contact the Secretary and ask, in confidence, whether the specific material carries a genuine security risk. The Secretary gives an impartial assessment of potential harm; the editor then makes the final decision, weighing that assessment against the public interest in publication.

The consultation is confidential in both directions. The Secretary does not disclose the inquiry to government as an investigative lead, and the editor retains complete freedom to publish. Nothing in the exchange obliges the journalist to reveal a source, to hand over material, or to hold a story.

What the system cannot do

Because the DSMA-Notice system is purely advisory, it has no coercive powers at all. The Committee cannot obtain an injunction, cannot impose a penalty, and cannot initiate a prosecution. It has no statutory basis on which to do any of those things. If the government wishes to restrain publication by law, it must go to court and seek an injunction on conventional grounds (for example breach of confidence), or rely on the criminal statutes — entirely separate processes in which the DSMA Committee plays no formal part.

The corollary is equally important: ignoring a DSMA-Notice is not, on its own, unlawful. A journalist who publishes against the Secretary's advice has not committed any offence merely by declining the advice. Legal liability, where it exists, flows from the statutes described below — not from the notice.

The real legal risk: Official Secrets and the National Security Act 2023

The DSMA system is best understood as a warning light rather than a wall. The actual legal constraints on publishing national-security information are found in criminal statute. The Official Secrets Act 1989 criminalises certain unauthorised disclosures by Crown servants, government contractors and others, across defined categories including security and intelligence, defence, and international relations. It contains no general public-interest defence, which makes it a significant hazard for journalists handling leaked official material.

The National Security Act 2023 substantially modernised this area. It repealed and replaced the espionage provisions of the older Official Secrets Acts of 1911, 1920 and 1939, and introduced new offences covering, among other things, obtaining or disclosing protected information and assisting a foreign intelligence service. The Official Secrets Act 1989, which governs unauthorised disclosure, remains in force alongside the 2023 Act.

The key point for editors: these statutes carry criminal liability regardless of whether a DSMA-Notice was consulted or heeded. Consultation may help you understand where the risk lies, but it neither creates nor removes it. Where a story engages this territory, read our companion guide on source protection and take specialist legal advice.

Practical guidance for newsrooms

• ›Treat DSMA consultation as a harm-assessment tool, not a legal sign-off. It informs your editorial judgement; it does not replace legal advice or confer immunity.
• ›Keep the two questions separate: 'Could this endanger security?' (DSMA territory) and 'Could publishing this be a criminal offence?' (Official Secrets Act 1989 and National Security Act 2023 territory). Answer both before publishing.
• ›If you receive leaked official material, involve your legal team early. The absence of a public-interest defence under the 1989 Act makes this an area of real exposure.
• ›Remember the Secretary cannot compel you and does not report your inquiry as a lead — but also cannot protect you from prosecution. The decision, and the responsibility, remain the editor's.
• ›Record your reasoning. A documented, good-faith assessment of the public interest against the identified security risk is valuable evidence of responsible journalism if the decision is later challenged.

Frequently asked questions