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9 min readSuper-injunction vs anonymised injunction: the critical distinction
The term “super-injunction” entered common usage after the 2009 Trafigura litigation, in which Carter-Ruck obtained an injunction that also prohibited reporting of the existence of the injunction and of parliamentary questions about it. The Master of the Rolls' Committee on Super-Injunctions, reporting in May 2011, drew a clear line between two types of order:
- A super-injunction: prohibits publication of specified information AND prohibits any disclosure of the existence of the proceedings or of the order itself. Genuinely rare; granted only where the court is satisfied that exceptional circumstances justify gagging even the fact of the gag.
- An anonymised injunction (the norm): prohibits publication of specified information and anonymises the parties in court records, but does not prohibit reporting that proceedings are ongoing or that an injunction exists. A journalist can report 'a public figure has obtained an injunction preventing disclosure of X' without naming them.
The practical consequence: if you receive notice of an order, read it carefully before making any editorial decision. The precise terms govern what you can and cannot publish.
Key cases: Trafigura, CTB, and the Spycatcher principle
Trafigura v Guardian News and Media (2009)was the case that brought super-injunctions to public attention. Carter-Ruck obtained an injunction that initially prevented the Guardian from reporting on a question tabled in Parliament by Paul Farrelly MP about the dumping of toxic waste in Côte d'Ivoire. Public outrage and a formal challenge led to the injunction being varied. The episode produced the 2011 committee report and a much stricter judicial approach to orders that suppress even the existence of litigation.
CTB v News Group Newspapers [2011] EWHC 1232 (QB)is the leading modern authority on anonymised privacy injunctions. The claimant obtained an injunction preventing publication of information about an alleged sexual relationship. Mr Justice Eady (and later Tugendhat J) upheld the injunction even after the claimant's identity was widely discussed on Twitter. The court held that the fact that information is available online does not automatically destroy a claimant's reasonable expectation of privacy, particularly where the publisher has resources to amplify it to a mass audience.
The Spycatcher principle from Attorney-General v Observer Ltd [1990] 1 AC 109 (House of Lords) establishes that third parties with notice of an injunction are bound by it even if not party to the original proceedings. This principle is the doctrinal basis for the risk journalists face when they become aware of an existing injunction and then publish the injuncted information.
Contempt risk for publication
Breaching an injunction with notice is civil contempt of court, punishable by fine or imprisonment for up to two years, plus an unlimited fine on the publisher as a body corporate. The AG can also bring proceedings for criminal contempt where the breach undermines the administration of justice.
The “jigsaw identification” risk is acute: even if you do not name the claimant, publishing details that would allow a reasonable reader to identify them from other publicly available information may breach the order. Courts have held that combining anonymised details with publicly known facts can amount to identification.
Generally safe
Reporting that an anonymised injunction exists; noting the court, the date, and the general subject-matter if the order permits; reporting parliamentary statements under qualified privilege.
High-risk territory
Naming the claimant; publishing photographs that identify them; reposting social-media content that names them; publishing details that cumulatively identify even without naming.
Twitter, social media, and the “thousands already know” argument
The CTB litigation demonstrated that English courts will uphold an injunction even where the claimant's identity is openly discussed online. The courts have consistently rejected the argument that widespread social-media naming removes the claimant's residual privacy interest. The reasoning: social-media discussion is diffuse and deniable; mainstream publication by a newspaper or broadcaster confers a qualitatively different and much larger audience and carries greater reputational force.
For UK-based journalists, retweeting or quoting a post that names an injunction claimant is legally indistinguishable from writing the name yourself — if you had notice of the injunction. The Spycatcher principle extends to all media, not just traditional publishers.
Overseas individuals who name claimants on social media may be beyond the reach of English contempt jurisdiction, but UK-based editors and publishers are not. This asymmetry has been criticised but remains the law as of 2026. See also misuse of private information for the underlying privacy tort that usually underpins these injunctions.
Post-Leveson and the current judicial approach
Leveson LJ's 2012 Inquiry report did not recommend abolition of privacy injunctions, which are grounded in the Human Rights Act 1998 and ECHR Article 8. It did recommend strengthening self-regulation and greater transparency about the number and nature of injunctions granted. The Judicial College's Guidance on Privacy Injunctions (updated 2022) now requires courts, when granting a super-injunction, to make a written record setting out the reasons why even the existence of proceedings must be kept confidential, and to list the case in a publicly accessible (though anonymised) register maintained by the King's Bench Division.
The effect is that the total number of such orders in force is now discernible in aggregate, even if the parties remain anonymous. As of the 2024 annual report from the judiciary, the number of active super-injunctions (as opposed to anonymised injunctions) remained in single figures. The Schillings and Carter-Ruck model of extensive injunctive relief is under sustained judicial pressure, with courts applying a stronger proportionality analysis under Human Rights Act s.12 before restricting the press. For SLAPP-adjacent injunctions, see also the SLAPP response playbook.
Parliamentary privilege and the Hemming precedent
Article IX of the Bill of Rights 1689 provides absolute immunity for anything said in the course of parliamentary proceedings. No court can restrain what an MP says in the chamber, and no contempt proceedings can arise from parliamentary speech alone. In May 2011 John Hemming MP used this privilege to name the footballer in the CTB injunction, on the basis that the name was already public on social media.
However, reporting what an MP says in Parliament does not give journalists carte blanche to publish the underlying injuncted information. The Defamation Act 1996 s.15 and Schedule 1 give qualified privilege to fair and accurate contemporaneous reports of parliamentary proceedings, but that qualified privilege protects the report of what the MP said — it does not override the injunction or remove the risk of contempt if the journalist goes beyond reporting the parliamentary statement and publishes the injuncted information independently. Take specific legal advice in this scenario.
Practical steps for newsrooms
- If you receive a letter or notification from solicitors mentioning an injunction, preserve the correspondence and immediately escalate to your legal team. Do not publish anything pending advice.
- Search the King's Bench Division anonymised injunction register and the judiciary's online resources before publishing a story that might engage a pre-existing order.
- Establish a clear social-media policy: reporters and editors with notice of an injunction must not share, retweet, or quote posts that name the claimant, even from personal accounts.
- Check whether your publisher carries appropriate media liability insurance that covers injunction-related contempt defence costs.
- If you believe an injunction is wrongly granted or disproportionate, the correct route is to apply to vary or discharge it — not to publish in defiance of it without taking advice.
Interaction with privacy and misuse of private information claims
Most super-injunctions and anonymised injunctions are sought in conjunction with a claim for misuse of private information — the tort recognised in Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22. The claimant must show a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information and that this outweighs the public interest in publication. An injunction is the interim remedy; damages and an account of profits may be the final remedy.
The “public interest” defence is available where the information relates to genuine wrongdoing or where the claimant has made the information part of their public persona. A footballer's private consensual relationship is unlikely to satisfy the public interest test; a politician's undisclosed financial conflicts of interest are more likely to. This balance is assessed under HRA 1998 ss.12 and 3. See our detailed guide on misuse of private information and the legal read process for pre-publication review steps.
Related guides
Primary sources
- Super-Injunctions, Anonymised Injunctions and Open Justice (Master of the Rolls, 2011)
- CTB v News Group Newspapers [2011] EWHC 1232 (QB) — BAILII
- Attorney-General v Observer Ltd [1990] 1 AC 109 (Spycatcher) — BAILII
- Human Rights Act 1998 (legislation.gov.uk)
- Judiciary guidance on privacy injunctions (judiciary.gov.uk)
- Inforrm — media law analysis